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# ECO 301 Intermediate Microeconomics _ Week9_Homework_Problem_Answer

ECO 301 Intermediate Microeconomics _ Week9_Homework_Problem_Answer

ECO 301 Intermediate Microeconomics _ Week9_Homework_Problem_Answer

ECO 301 Intermediate Microeconomics _ Week9_Homework_Problem_Answer

ECO 301 Intermediate Microeconomics _ Week9_Homework_Problem_Answer

ECO 301 Intermediate Microeconomics _ Week9_Homework_Problem_Answer

ECO 301 Intermediate Microeconomics _ Week9_Homework_Problem_Answer

Homework Problems:
o Chapter 15: 15.2(a-c), 15.5(a, b only ), 15.8(a-b), 15.9(a-c)
o Chapter 16: 16.2(a-c), 16.4(a-d), 16.6(a-e), 16.8(a-c), 16.9(a-d)

15.2(a-c) Ans:

a. 50% share of profit: EU = (1/2)(1/2)(\$1000) + (1/2)(1/2)(\$400) – \$100 = \$250. Clare would accept this contract since her EU is greater than her outside option.

15.5(a, b) Ans:

15.8(a, b) Ans:

Ans:

a) Compute the buyer’s maximum willingness to pay if he or she cannot observe he car’s quality.

Ans: EV = (1/2) *10000

Chapter 16: 16.2(a-c),
Ans:

2. (a) If fishers receive the average amount caught on each lake, fishers will fish in each lake until the average amount caught in each lake is equal. In Lake Y, the average amount is constant; however, in Lake X, the average amount declines

16.6(a-e), Ans:

(a) The socially optimal level of methane production will be when marginal benefits and marginal costs of this pollution reduction are equal

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